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Abstract
We study the transition to a carbon-free economy in a model with a pol-
luting non-renewable resource and a clean renewable resource. Transforming
primary energy into ready-to-use energy services is costly and more efficient
energy transformation rates are more costly to achieve. Renewable energy
competes with food production for land and the food productivity of land
can be improved at some cost. To avoid catastrophic climate damages, the
pollution stock is mandated to stay below a given cap. When the economy is
not constrained by the cap, the efficiency of energy transformation increases
steadily until the transition toward the ultimate green economy; when renew-
able energy is exploited, its land use rises at the expense of food production;
food productivity increases together with the land rent but food produc-
tion drops; the food and energy prices increase and renewables substitute for
non-renewable energy. During the constrained phase, the economy follows
a constant path of prices, quantities, efficiency rates, food productivity and
land rent, a phenomenon we call the ’ceiling efficiency paradox’.
Keywords: energy efficiency; carbon pollution; non-renewable resources;
renewable resources; land uses.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to examine how should be simultaneously de-
termined the optimal dynamics of the conversion rates of primary energy
resources into useful energy together with the energy mix and the allocation
of land amongst food and energy production while taking into account that
the atmospheric pollution stock cannot exceed some catastrophic triggering
level. The transition toward a green economy requires significant improve-
ments of the conversion rates of primary energies into useful energy, what
Fouquet (2008) calls ’energy services’, and a progressive substitution of car-
bon free energy sources for polluting fossil fuels. Developing the use of green
energy implies also a competition for the land uses. The deployment of green
energy consists in allocating a larger part of the solar radiation to the pro-
duction of useful energy and a smaller part to the production of food because
for capturing the solar primary resource, in most cases, land is needed.1
Furthermore, given that the atmospheric pollution stock must be kept
under some ceiling to avoid catastrophic damages, the urgency of the substi-
tution and/or the conversion rate improvements to carry out evolves through
time. We show that along the optimal paths, all the substitutions and conver-
sion rate improvements must be stopped within the phase during which the
maximum pollution stock constraint is binding. The efforts must be made
before the arrival at the ceiling, to delay the arrival time of the constraint
while beginning the transition, and after the phase at the ceiling to complete
the transition.
Dynamics of the conversion rates
It is well known from the pathbreaking work of Carnot (1824) that any
conversion of some form of energy into another one implies a loss, the so-called
Second Law of Thermodynamics. The increases of the conversion rates of
primary energy into useful one, that is the increases of the thermal efficiency
of the energy converters, have been spectacular from the beginning of the
eighteenth century. The Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the thermal
efficiency of the succession of the different kinds of engines.
1Admittedly a small amount of green energy can be produced by windmills in shallows.
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Figure 1: Trends of Thermal Energy Conversion.
Source: Smil V. (2010), p 210.
Similar increases can be recorded fo other energy converters in lightning
and heating. Amongst the other converters are the converters of the solar
radiation into useful energy and/or food.2 Some records are short but sig-
nificant, for example the increase of the solar cells efficiency or the decrease
of the surfaces required by the successive generations of bio-fuels (Dutta et
al. (2014)). For the conversion rates into agricultural products, themselves
to be transformed in food and/or other form of useful energy, the record is
more documented. Because the average solar radiation received per unit of
land surface can be roughly taken as constant in a not too long run historical
perspective, an index of the thermal efficiency of the transformation is the
output per surface unit (see Figure 2).
Technical progress is generally seen as the main driving force of these ther-
mal efficiency rate improvements.3 Although it would not be appropriate to
deny the role of cumulative scientific knowledge and technical mastery, the
2Food is nothing but some other form of energy services once cooked, what requires
additional energy.
3The literature on the role of technical progress is immense. For a recent contribution
see Acemoglu et al. (2016).
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Figure 2: Trends of Agricultural Yields (World Scale).
Source: Smil V. (2008), p 396, compiled by the author from UN FAO
statistical yearbooks.
choice of an efficiency rate is also an economic choice resulting from substi-
tution decisions amongst inputs.4 More thermally efficient energy converters
are also generally more costly. Here we aim at determining the dynamics of
thermal efficiency rates resulting from the substitutions absent any technical
progress.5
Land uses and fossil fuel competition
4However note that all the improvements of the eighteenth century and the first part
of the nineteenth century were made without strong theory of the thermodynamic laws,
but with a deep empirical understanding of the necessity of heat saving. The first edition
of the Carnot memoir is dated from 1824 and had a rather confidential reception. The
mainly referred edition is the 1844 one, even today.
5A large part of the literature assumes given and fixed conversion rates for different
energy sources or introduces exogenous trends of conversion improvements. On the theo-
retical side in this vein, main early contributions are Farzin (1986), Farzin and Tahvonen
(1996), Tahvonen and Withagen (1996), Toman and Withagen (2000), Withagen (1994).
For more recent contributions see André and Smulders(2014), Golosov et al. (2014), Van
der Ploeg and Withagen (2014). The applied literature has intensively used integrated
assessment models to assess climate policy options. Prominent contributions are Gerlagh
and Van der Zwaan (2006), Nordhaus (2014) and Stern (2007). The other great tradition
issued from Dasgupta and Heal (1974) on the contrary insists on the possible substitutions
mainly between energy and capital.
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The choices of the energy conversion rates are clearly entangled within
the choice of using fossil fuels rather than renewable primary sources requir-
ing land surface to be deployed, and land surfaces can be allocated either
to the production of food or the production of other kinds of useful energy.6
Thus the long way toward a green economy is also a path of land realloca-
tion amongst food production and useful energy production together with
a reallocation of useful energy production amongst non renewable primary
resources and renewables ones.
The issue has raised many contributions. Empirical and theoretical anal-
ysis point out a positive effect on food prices of the expansion of bio-fuels
production.7 8 Furthermore food and energy productions have also direct
impacts on the deforestation and the value of forest lands, and the induced
wood production contributes temporarily to the renewable energy supply.9
Atmospheric carbon pollution
The adoption of more thermally efficient techniques in the transformation
of fossil fuels is in competition with the substitution with clean renewable
resources to reduce the atmospheric CO2 concentration. Burning fossil fu-
els to produce useful energy releases polluting emissions in the atmosphere.
To prevent excessive climate damages the atmospheric carbon concentration
must be maintained below some cap, or ceiling, as in Chakravorty et al.
(2006). We consider the empirically relevant situation in which fossil fu-
els are so abundant that the economy will be eventually constrained by the
atmospheric carbon cap. In contrast with climate models in the so-called
’carbon budget’ style, we introduce explicitly the natural transfer of carbon
from the atmosphere into the oceans and soils as a self-regenerating capacity
of the environment determining together with the emission flow the dynamics
of the pollution stock. We aim to assess not only the qualitative evolutions
of the economic variables of the model, but also the optimal timing of the
energy transition and the optimal period during which the economy should
6Mohr and Russan (2011), Sengers et al. (2010)
7Bahel et al (2011), Chakravorty et al. (2017), Diermeier and Schmidt (2014), Grafton
et al. (2012), Gronwald et al. (2017), Hertel et al. (2010), Khanna et al. (2016), Popp et
al. (2014), Rajcaniova et al. (2014), Rosegrant et al. (2008), Somerville and Long (2015).
8This interlinkage between the food and the energy prices extends to the transmission
of price volatility between markets.
9Andrade de Sà et al. (2013), Hoel and Sletten (2016), Lundberg et al. (2015) and
Zilberman et al. (2017).
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face the carbon cap constraint.
To keep the model more easily tractable we aggregate the energy conver-
sion activities by households and industries into one energy transformation
sector using renewable and non renewable primary energy inputs to be con-
verted into ready-to-use energy services. For each primary source the trans-
formation sector adapts to the dynamics of the environmental regulation and
to the economic conditions in primary resources provision by optimizing its
conversion techniques. The fossil fuel price and the social cost of carbon are
determined endogenously together with the optimal dynamics of the ther-
mal efficiencies. We postulate stock-dependent extraction costs of the fossil
resource and show how is also endogenously determined the part of the fos-
sil endowment left forever underground, what we call the un-burned fossil
resource stock.10
Main results
Our findings are the following. The energy transition is a sequence of three
time phases. During a first phase, the economy accumulates carbon until it
faces the cap constraint. Then the cap binds, implying a constant rate of
fossil fuel extraction. The fossil resource being exhaustible, there must exist
some time when even without a carbon constraint, the economy would choose
to extract fossil resources at a lower rate than what is mandated by the cap.
Thus the economy escapes from the cap and enters an unconstrained phase
until the end of fossil fuel exploitation, that is the ultimate green economic
regime when the society produces only renewable energy and food.11 Before
the constrained period, the shadow cost of carbon rises, next decreases during
the constrained phase, down to zero at the end of the phase and forever. This
sequence of time phases and the time profile of the carbon price are similar
to the findings of the literature using carbon concentration mandates.
During the unconstrained phases, the useful energy price rises together
with the conversion rate of crude fossil energy into useful energy. When re-
newable energy is produced jointly with non-renewable energy, its conversion
10Mc Glade and Ekins (2014), Resai and Van der Ploeg (2013, 2017).
11The actual possibility of a 100 % renewable energy economy is debated since long, see
for example Mathiesen et al., 2011, for the energy systems and Bryngelsson and Lindgren,
2013, for bio-energy. See also Sinn (2017) for a recent skeptical appraisal of the German
program.
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rate rises also and it takes an increasing share in the energy mix. Further-
more the land use devoted to renewable energy expands at the expense of
the land use for food production and the land rent increases. The food sec-
tor reacts to this trend by increasing its productivity, although insufficiently
to prevent the decline of the food production rate and thus the rise of the
food price. Such findings are in line with the existing studies of the land
use competition between food and bio-fuels production. Our contribution
strengthens their conclusions by showing that even if the food sector can
improve its productivity, food supply should still decrease.
In our framework the optimal carbon price path fully internalizes the
potentially adverse impacts of the climate regulation on the food delivery
conditions inside a dynamic setting, a novel feature of our model as far as we
know. However full internalization does not alter qualitatively the conclusion
of a positive effect of carbon regulation on food prices. A high degree of
substituability between bio-fuels and fossils magnifies this impact, a point
we emphasize in the concluding remarks of the paper by showing that with
imperfect substitution possibilities, the impact of carbon pricing on food
production could be lower.
During the constrained phase, the exploitation rate of fossil fuels must
stay constant. This induces a constant price of useful energy and constant
energy conversion rates. Implied by this constancy, the land sharing be-
tween renewable energy production and food production remains constant,
together with the land rent level. The food production sector then maintains
a constant productivity and constant levels of food production rate, thus
of the food price. We call this phenomenon the ’ceiling efficiency paradox’
since, paradoxically, in the period in which the environmental constraint is
most pressing, the economy optimally refrains from further efforts to miti-
gate the effects of the constraint through better fossil energy conversion or
more renewable energy production.
This rather striking conclusion is a direct product of our distinctive ap-
proach of energy efficiency gains. In our model the energy production sec-
tors do not benefit from technical progress in the form of cost reductions per
unit of useful energy but can improve their energy conversion performance
through costly efforts. We show that when faced with a climate regulation
policy aiming at stabilizing the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, the
today policy goal of the governments, the energy industry determines its en-
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ergy conversion strategy by solving a time independent static optimization
problem, resulting in time independent, that is stationary energy conver-
sion rates. This time stationarity extends to the land sharing between food
production and renewable energy production, in turn stabilizing the food
delivery conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
In section 3 we formulate the optimality problem and characterize the main
features of the variables dynamics. The optimal paths are described in section
4. The last section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model extends Chakravorty et al. (2008) and Bahel et al. (2013). Alter-
natively it may be seen as another example of how a renewable resource, the
services from land, can be used to produce several kinds of final goods, one of
which could be also produced by a nonrenewable resource, as in Gaudet et al.
(2006). We consider an economy producing both food and energy services.12
Food production requires both land and other inputs. Energy services can be
produced from either the exploitation of a polluting non-renewable resource
(oil) or the exploitation of land (solar) both with other inputs.13
Food, energy needs and gross surplus
Let us denote respectively by qe and qf the instantaneous consumption
rates of energy and food. To simplify we first assume that the gross surplus
generated by any pair of instantaneous consumption rates, u(qe, qf ), is ad-
ditively separable and may be written as u(qe, qf ) = ue(qe) + uf (qf ), each
function ui, i = e, f , satisfying the standard following assumption A.1.
12From a pure energy perspective, food is an energy service, and a vital one. However
according to the Guide Michelin other characteristics than the pure energy content of food
should be taken into account. We neglect the qualitative characteristics of food given the
problem at stake.
13We subsume as ’solar energy’, different renewable energy sources requiring space
and/or sun energy like PV cells, wind energy or biofuels.
7
Assumption A. 1 For any i = e, f , ui : R+ → R is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing, u′i ≡ dui/dqi > 0, strictly concave, u′′i (qi) ≡
d2ui/dq
2
i < 0, and satisfies the basic Inada condition: limqi↓0 u′i(qi) = +∞.
Assumption A.1 is not innocuous, asserting that a smaller food diet may
be compensated by a larger energy consumption.14 We denote by pi(qi) the
marginal gross surplus function, or inverse demand function, pi(qi) ≡ u′i(qi).
The transformation sectors
The transformation sectors convert primary inputs into final goods, food
or energy services. The solar and food sectors convert the solar radiation
and space (land) into useful energy and food. The oil sector produces useful
energy from crude oil. This sector includes two industries: the extractive, or
mining industry, produces extracted oil from the underground resource and
the oil transformation industry produces energy services from extracted oil.
LetX(t) denote the underground stock of oil at time tmeasured in energy
units, X0 the initial endowment, X(0) = X0, and x(t) the instantaneous
extraction rate or oil production: X˙(t) = −x(t). The unitary extraction
cost depends on the grade under exploitation, as in Heal (1976) or Lehvari
and Liviatan (1977). Let a(X) denote this unitary cost. The function a(.)
satisfies the following standard assumptions.15
Assumption A. 2 a : (0, X0] → R+ is twice continuously differentiable
on (0, X0), strictly decreasing, a′(X) ≡ da(X)/dX < 0, strictly convex,
a′′(X) ≡ d2a(X)/dX2 > 0, with a(0+) = +∞ and a′(0+) = +∞.
Under a′(0+) = +∞ and the below assumptions on the solar energy costs,
some part of the oil endowment is left underground.
Let us denote by ηx the useful energy obtained by the oil transformation
industry from one unit of extracted oil energy, what we call also the efficiency
14We discuss the implications of alternative assumptions in the sub-section 2.1.
15For any function f(x) defined on X ⊆ R, and for any x¯ ∈ X, we denote by f(x¯−) and
f(x¯+) respectively, the limits limx↑x¯ f(x) and limx↓x¯ f(x) when such limits exist.
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rate of the industry, and by qx ≡ ηxx, the useful energy production rate of
the oil sector. Similarly, we denote by ηy the fraction of intercepted solar
energy transformed into useful energy. As for the food sector, we denote by
ηf the food productivity of land.
For the sector i, i = x, y, f , let ηˆi be the upper bound on ηi, attainable
only at prohibitive costs. Thermodynamic principles exclude the possibility
of a one-to-one transformation of primary energy into useful energy, thus
ηi ≤ ηˆi < 1 for the energy transformation sectors x and y. For the food
sector, plant and animal physiology constrain ηf to be lower than some finite
limit ηˆf .
The solar energy sector uses some part Ly of the available land L¯ to
produce useful energy. This sector includes all the activities required to
bring ready-to-use energy to the final users. Thus it may include agricultural
activities when, for example, ethanol is produced from sugar cane, together
with all the industrial processes necessary to transform the sugar cane into
ethanol.16 The available land is assumed to be homogeneous and to receive
ym units of solar energy per acreage unit. The problem of the solar energy
sector is to convert ym into useful energy. The useful energy produced by the
solar sector, denoted by qy, amounts to ηyymLy.
The food sector includes not only the farming sector but also all the
industrial activities necessary to bring ready-to-eat food to the consumers.
Let Lf be the acreage of land devoted to the production of food so that the
total food production amounts to ηfLf .
Choosing higher conversion rates implies to put into operation more elab-
orate techniques in the energy transformation sectors, but also more costly
ones. Let us denote by bx(ηx) the conversion cost per unit of extracted oil
in the oil transformation industry, hence a total cost bx(ηx)x. Similarly let
by(ηy) be the conversion cost per unit of solar energy in the solar transforma-
tion industry, hence a total cost by(ηy)ymLy. Then the average production
costs per unit of useful energy amounts to bi(ηi)/ηi, i = x, y, which is equal
to its marginal cost. We assume that these average costs are increasing in
both useful energy production sectors, implying that b′i(ηi) is also increasing.
16On the area required according to the type of power generation, see for example Cheng
and Hammond (2017).
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Let bf (ηf ) be the food production cost per unit of land, hence an average
cost bf (ηf )/ηf per unit of food, also equal to the marginal cost of food.
Increasing food productivity requires more advanced techniques, thus more
costly ones, so that the unitary cost per unit of food increases with the
productivity of operated production process, together with b′f (ηf ).17
Summing up the assumptions on the production cost structure in the
three sectors:
Assumption A. 3 bi : [0, ηˆi) → R+, i = x, y, f , is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable on (0, ηˆi), strictly increasing, b′i(ηi) > 0, strictly convex, b′′i (ηi) =
d2bi(ηi)/dη
2
i > 0, with bi(0+) = 0, b′i(0+) > 0, b(ηˆ
−
i ) = +∞ and b′(ηˆ−i ) =
+∞. The average production cost of the final good, energy or food, and so
the marginal cost, is a strictly increasing function of ηi: b′i(ηi) > bi(ηi)/ηi
and limηi↓0 bi(ηi)/ηi > 0.18
Producing useful energy or food requires other costly inputs than the oil
resource, land or solar radiation, hence a strictly positive marginal cost at
0+: limηi↓0 bi(ηi)/ηi > 0. The assumptions bi(ηˆ
−
i ) = +∞ and b′i(ηˆ−i ) = +∞
mean that a complete conversion of crude energy or the attainment of the
physiological limit to food productivity are not feasible.
The increasing pattern of production costs with the energy conversion
performance, or the food productivity enhancement, can also be explained
by the need to use more inputs that are costly to boost performance (see
Appendix A.1 for a formal presentation).
Carbon pollution
Burning oil to produce useful energy generates a pollution flow propor-
tional to the flow of the extracted oil input used in the transformation in-
17Differentiating the average production cost bi(ηi)/ηi, i = x, y, f , yields:
d
dηi
b(ηi)
ηi
=
1
ηi
[
b′i(ηi)−
bi(ηi)
ηi
]
.
Hence b′i(ηi) > 0 is necessary for d (bi(ηi)/ηi) /dηi > 0.
18Note that b′i(ηi) > b(ηi)/ηi, ηi ∈ (0, ηˆi), implies that b′i(0+) ≥ limηi↓0 bi(ηi)/ηi, hence
b′i(0
+) > 0.
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dustry. Let ζ be the unitary pollution content of oil, hence a pollution flow
ζx(t) at time t, feeding the atmospheric pollution stock. Denote by Z(t) the
size of this pollution stock at time t and by Z0 the stock inherited from the
past, Z(0) = Z0. The pollution stock self-depletes at a proportional rate
α, assumed constant to simplify. Hence the dynamics of Z(t) is given by
Z˙(t) = ζx(t)− αZ(t).
The atmospheric pollution concentration is constrained to be kept at most
equal to some cap, or ceiling, Z¯, to prevent excessive climate damages, as in
Chakravorty et al. (2006). As far as the average earth temperature level is
an increasing function of the atmospheric carbon concentration, such a cap
may be seen as another formulation of the +20C target assuming that +20C
is an effective constraint and not a mere wish. In order that the model makes
sense we must assume that Z0 < Z¯. When the ceiling constraint binds, then
there is a cap on the oil input in the transformation industry, a cap we denote
by x¯: x¯ = αZ¯/ζ.
2.1 The optimal land use and the land rent
We assume that the allocation of land to the production of energy and food
can be adjusted freely and instantaneously. For any acreage of land devoted
to energy production, L∗y, the optimal management of the food sector is this
pair (ηf , Lf ) solving the following food sector problem (F.S.P ):19
(F.S.P ) maxηf ,Lf uf (ηfLf )− bf (ηf )Lf
s.t. L¯− L∗y − Lf ≥ 0 .
Denote by pi the multiplier associated to the land availability constraint,
equivalently the land rent. A strong implication of the assumption A.3 is the
following proposition whose proof is given in Appendix A.2.
Proposition P. 1 Under the assumptions A.1 and A.3, whatever L∗y ∈ [0, L¯),
the food land is scarce, that is the solution Lf of the (F.S.P.) problem is equal
to L¯− L∗y and the land rent pi is strictly positive.
19We neglect the non-negativity constraints on ηf , Lf and the upper bound constraint
on ηf , all of which are satisfied.
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The intuition behind this result is quite clear. Assumption A.3 means
that extensive agricultures are less costly than intensive ones. Assume that
a quantity of food qf is produced with an acreage Lf and a productivity
ηf : qf = ηfLf . Assume also that the land constraint is slack. Then the
same quantity of food can be produced on a larger acreage with a lower
productivity. Since a more extensive land exploitation is less costly, so is the
total cost of qf and (ηf , Lf ) cannot be optimal.
It is worth pointing out that this result does not arise in Chakravorty et
al. (2008). In their model, the food productivity level is fixed and cannot be
chosen by the food sector. Given this level, it is possible that the food sector
should cultivate only a fraction of the available land, the land not used for
energy or food production remaining fallow. In the present case, the food
sector can practice an extensive (and thus cheap) agriculture on the whole
land which is not used for energy production.
The other assumption having strong implications on the agricultural sec-
tor is the additive separability of the gross surplus function.
Proposition P. 2 Under the assumption of additive separability of the gross
surplus function and the assumption A.3, the productivity in the food sector,
the food production rate, hence the food price, are all constant when the land
acreage devoted to the energy production is constant.
Under the separability assumption, the surplus generated in the food
sector is given by uf (ηfLf ). Thus when Ly is constant and thus Lf = L¯−Ly is
also constant, the maximization of uf (ηf (t)Lf )−bf (ηf (t))Lf does not depend
upon t. Without the separability assumption, the objective function becomes
u(qe(t), ηf (t)Lf )−bf (ηf (t))Lf and ηf (t) changes with qe(t) (see Appendix A.2
for further details).
An implication of the Proposition 2 is that, when the energy needs are fed
only by oil, the food consumption rate, the food price level and the land rent
should be constant for two reasons. On the one hand, Ly = 0 implies that
Lf (t) = L¯, a constant, and on the other hand, the food productivity rate, ηf ,
should also be constant under the separability assumption, hence qf = ηf L¯ is
constant together with pf = u′f (qf ) and pi = pfηf − bf (ηf ), independently of
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the possible time evolutions of the oil extraction rate, x(t), the useful energy
production rate, qe(t) = qx(t), and the energy price, pe(t).
2.2 The ultimate green economy
Under the assumption A.2, the economy will reach, either in finite time or
asymptotically in infinite time, the pure renewable energy regime, what we
call the ultimate green economy.20 We now describe the main characteristics
of this final regime.
It will be shown later that the economy is no more facing the pollution
stock constraint after some finite time t¯Z . The land allocation being freely
adjustable, the renewable energy transformation rate, the food productivity
level and the land allocation to renewable energy and food production con-
verge toward a vector of constant levels, (η˜y, η˜f , L˜y, L˜f ). This vector solves
the following static green economy problem (G.E.P ):21
(G.E.P ) max
ηy ,ηf ,Ly ,Lf
ue(ηyy
mLy) + uf (ηfLf )− by(ηy)ymLy − bf (ηf )Lf
s.t. L¯− Ly − Lf ≥ 0 .
Keeping the notation pi for the multiplier associated to the land availability
constraint yields among the f.o.c’s:
u′e(ηyy
mLy)ηyy
m = by(ηy)y
m + pi (2.1)
u′f (ηfLf )ηf = bf (ηf ) + pi , (2.2)
together with the usual complementary slackness condition associated to the
land availability constraint.
The conditions (2.1) and (2.2) together state the arbitrage condition in
land allocation. The land rent pi must be the same in both food and energy
sectors:
[u′e (ηyy
mLy) ηy − by(ηy)] ym = pi = u′f (ηfLf )− bf (ηf ) . (2.3)
20See Salant et al., 1983, for a proof that in an exhaustible resource model of the present
type, the economy could end the extraction process only asymptotically.
21We omit the constraints 0 ≤ ηy ≤ ηˆy, 0 ≤ ηf ≤ ηˆf , 0 ≤ Ly and 0 ≤ Lf , which are
satisfied as strict inequalities under the assumptions A.1 and A3.
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The l.h.s. of the equality is the marginal net surplus resulting from the
allocation of an additional unit of land to energy production and the r.h.s. is
the net marginal surplus of allocating this land unit to food production. Un-
der our assumptions, the program (G.E.P ) admits a unique strictly positive
solution. For further reference, we denote by p˜i, i = e, f , the corresponding
shadow prices of energy and food and by p˜i the land rent.
3 The social planner problem
3.1 The problem
The social planner determines the paths of oil extraction, x(t), of the energy
transformation rates ηx(t) and ηy(t), of the productivity of land for food pro-
duction, ηf (t), and of the land allocation, Ly(t) and Lf (t), which maximize
the social welfare. Let ρ be the social discount rate, assumed positive and
constant. The planner solves the following (S.P.) problem:22
22We omit the constraints 0 ≤ X(t), ηx(t) ≤ ηˆx, ηy(t) ≤ ηˆy, 0 ≤ ηf (t) < ηˆf and
0 ≤ Lf (t) which are all satisfied as strict inequalities under the assumptions A.1 to A.3.
Note also that under costless and instantaneously adjustable land allocation, the land
allocation at time t = 0 is endogenously determined and not inherited from the past,
contrarily to the initial oil and pollution stocks.
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(S.P.)
max
{x(t), ηx(t), ηy(t)
ηf (t), Ly(t), Lf (t)}∞0
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
{ue (ηx(t)x(t) + ηy(t)ymLy(t)) + uf (ηf (t)Lf (t))
−a(X(t))x(t)− bx(ηx(t))x(t)
−by(ηy(t))ymLy(t)− bf (ηf (t))Lf (t)} e−ρtdt
X˙(t) = −x(t) , X(0) = X0 given
L¯− Ly(t)− Lf (t) ≥ 0 , Lf (t) ≥ 0 , Ly(t) ≥ 0
Z˙(t) = ζx(t)− αZ(t) , Z(0) = Z0 < Z¯ given
and Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0
x(t) ≥ 0 , ηx(t) ≥ 0 and ηy(t) ≥ 0 .
Let λ and −µ be the co-state variables associated to X and Z respec-
tively.23 The current value Hamiltonian of the (S.P.) problem, denoted by
H, reads:24
H = ue (ηxx+ ηyymLy) + uf (ηfLf )− a(X)x
−bx(ηx)x− by(ηy)ymLy − bf (ηf )Lf − λx− µ[ζx− αZ] .
Denote by pi the Lagrange multiplier associated to the land availability con-
straint, like in the green economy problem, by γLy the multiplier associated
to the non-negativity constraint on the land acreage devoted to energy pro-
duction, by ν the multiplier associated to the cap constraint on the pollution
stock and by γx, γηx, and γηy the multipliers associated to the non-negativity
constraints on x, ηx and ηy respectively. Let L be the current value La-
grangian of the problem:
L = H + pi[L¯− Ly − Lf ] + γLyLy + ν[Z¯ − Z]
+γxx+ γηxηx + γηyηy .
23By choosing −µ as the co-state variable of Z, we may interpret µ as the shadow
marginal cost of the pollution stock.
24We omit the time index when this causes no confusion.
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The f.o.c’s are:
∂L
∂x
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηxx+ ηyymLy)ηx = a(X) + λ+ bx(ηx) + ζµ− γx
(3.1)
∂L
∂ηx
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηxx+ ηyymLy)x = b′x(ηx)x− γηx (3.2)
∂L
∂Ly
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηxx+ ηyymLy)ηyym = by(ηy)ym + pi − γLy (3.3)
∂L
∂ηy
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηxx+ ηyymLy)ymLy = b′y(ηy)ymLy − γηy (3.4)
∂L
∂Lf
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ηfLf )ηf = bf (ηf ) + pi (3.5)
∂L
∂ηf
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ηfLf ) = b′f (ηf ) , (3.6)
together with the usual complementary slackness conditions.
The dynamics of the co-state variables must satisfy when time differen-
tiable:
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂L
∂X
=⇒ λ˙(t) = ρλ(t) + a′ (X(t))x(t) (3.7)
µ˙ = ρµ+
∂L
∂Z
=⇒ µ˙(t) = (ρ+ α)µ(t)− ν(t) (3.8)
ν(t) ≥ 0, Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 and ν(t) [Z¯ − Z(t)] = 0 . (3.9)
The transversality condition at infinity is:
lim
t↑∞
[λ(t)X(t) + µ(t)Z(t)] e−ρt = 0 . (3.10)
3.2 General properties of the optimal paths
We first present general properties of the optimum. The next subsections
will describe the characteristics of the optimal energy transition toward the
green economy.
Cost minimization in the transformation industries
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Consider first the transformation of oil into useful energy. One unit of oil
costs a+ λ and burning it to produce useful energy has an opportunity cost
ζµ. The industry can produce ηx units of useful energy with this oil unit, at
an additional cost bx(ηx). Thus the average cost of the useful energy amounts
to [a + λ + ζµ + bx(ηx)]/ηx and is U -shaped provided that b′′x(ηx) > 0. This
unitary cost is minimized for ηx such that the marginal cost b′(ηx) is equal
to the average cost. This is the meaning of (3.1)-(3.2).
For the solar industry, one unit of land costs pi and gives access to ym
units of solar energy allowing to produce ηyym units of useful energy at the
additional cost by(ηy)ym, hence an average cost [pi + by(ηy)ym]/ηyym. This
average cost is U -shaped provided that b′′y(ηy) > 0. The average cost is
minimized for ηy such that the marginal cost b′y(ηy)/ym is equal to the unit
cost. This is the meaning of (3.3)-(3.4) when Ly > 0.
The same argument shows that (3.5)-(3.6) means that the minimum av-
erage cost of food [pi + bf (ηf )]/ηf is equal to its marginal cost b′f (ηf ).
Land use and land rent
The land allocation is determined by the sub-system (3.3)-(3.6). The
link between the two alternative uses of the land is given by the land rent,
pi, which appears in (3.3) for the energy production and in (3.5) for the
food production. The link between the land allocation problem and the
competitiveness of the oil sector is given by the shadow price of the useful
energy, pe = u′e, which appears in (3.3) and (3.4) for the solar energy sector
and in (3.1) and (3.2) for the oil sector.
If Lf > 0, (3.6) defines the food productivity as an increasing function
of the shadow price of food. Denote by ηpf (pf ) this relationship and by
vf (pf ) ≡ pfηpf (pf ) − bf (ηpf (pf )), the gross margin on food production per
cultivated land unit as a function of the food price. The food gross margin is
an increasing function of the food price.25 On the other hand, an increase of
pf implies a decrease of qf = ηfLf . When the food price is higher, the food
productivity is increased and Lf should decrease. Then (3.5): vf (pf ) = pi
shows that the food price will be raised by an increase of pi. The optimal
reaction of the food sector to an increase of the land rent is thus an increase
25Taking (3.6) into account, v′f (pf ) = η
p
f (pf ) + (pf − b′f )dηpf/dpf = ηpf (pf ) > 0.
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of the food price, a rise of the food land productivity and a drop of the food
land acreage together with the food supply.
On the other hand, (3.4) defines similarly ηpy(pe), the optimal conversion
rate of solar energy, as an increasing function of the shadow price of energy.
Let vy(pe) ≡
[
peη
p
y(pe)− by(ηpy(pe))
]
ym, denote the gross margin on solar
energy production per land unit, an increasing function of the energy price.
(3.3) : vy(pe) = pi shows that an increase of the useful energy price induces
an increase of the land rent.
In order that the land be optimally allocated between energy and food
production, an arbitrage condition similar to (2.3) must hold. The land rent
must be the same for food land and energy land, (3.3) and (3.5) implying
that:
vy(pe) = pi = vf (pf ) . (3.11)
Hence an increase of the useful energy price induces an increase of the food
price, and thus a rise of the land rent, of the food productivity rate together
with a fall of Lf , the acreage of cultivated land for food production. The
whole available land, L¯, having to be exploited, a decrease of Lf means an
increase of Ly, the land acreage cultivated for energy production.
The optimal reaction of the solar energy sector to an increase of the
useful energy price is to increase its conversion performance while expanding
its land occupation. This induces an increase of the land rent. The food
sector reacts to this increase by raising its productivity, the productivity rise
failing to compensate for the loss of food acreage. Hence the food supply
decreases and the food price increases.
Competitiveness of solar energy exploitation
In order that the renewable energy sector be active, the energy price
must be at least equal to the lowest unit cost of this energy, that is pe ≥
limηy↓0 by(ηy)/ηy. Although necessary, this condition is not sufficient because
it does not take into account the opportunity cost of diverting land from food
production. This opportunity cost is the value of the land rent when all the
land, L¯, is allocated to the food sector.
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If Lf = L¯, the optimal productivity in the food sector, ηf solves (3.6):
u′f (ηf L¯) = b
′
f (ηf ). The food price is pf = u
′
f (ηf L¯) and the land rent amounts
to pi = p
f
η
f
− bf (ηf ). Hence the energy price triggering the production of
solar energy, pye , is the price level solving:
[peηy − by(ηy)] ym = pi where ηy solves (3.3) : pe = b′y(ηy) .
For energy prices pe > pye some acreage must be allocated to energy pro-
duction and (3.11) holds. When the production energy starts, the initial
transformation ηfy is this rate solution of pye = b′y(ηy).26
Mining rent and full marginal cost of oil exploitation
According to (3.7) the dynamics of the mining rent is not necessarily
monotonous since a′(X) < 0. However, the full marginal cost of the ex-
tracted oil, that is the marginal cost augmented by the mining rent, is in-
creasing throughout time. Let us denote by θ(t) this full marginal cost:
θ(t) ≡ a(X(t)) + λ(t). Time differentiating and substituting (3.7) for λ˙
yields:
θ˙(t) = −a′(X(t))x(t) + ρλ(t) + a′(X(t))x(t) = ρλ(t) > 0 .
(3.12)
Along the optimal path, the behavior of the full marginal cost of extracted
oil is dominated by the increase of its marginal extraction cost component:
sign θ˙(t) = sign a˙(X(t)) = −sign a′(X(t))x(t) > 0, θ(t) being strictly time
increasing until the transition to the green economy.27
Shadow marginal cost of pollution
26Note that although ηy, the transformation rate of renewable energy jumps from 0 up
to ηfy when the production of renewable energy starts, the production of renewable energy
starts smoothly because the land allocated to this production does not jump but increases
progressively.
27However the discounted mining rent, λ(t)e−ρt, is unambiguously decreasing. From
(3.7) we obtain:
d
dt
{
λ(t)e−ρt
}
= a′ (X(t))x(t)e−ρt < 0 .
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Let us denote by tZ and t¯Z the times at which respectively begins and
ends the period during which the constraint Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 binds. Since
initially the pollution stock is smaller than the cap, Z0 < Z¯, there must exist
some pre-ceiling period [0, tZ), 0 < tZ , during which the constraint does not
bind, hence ν(t) = 0, t < tZ , and µ˙ = (ρ+ α)µ, so that:
µ(t) = µ0e(ρ+α)t , t ∈ [0, tZ) , µ0 ≡ µ(0) . (3.13)
After t¯Z , since the constraint will be never anymore active, then:
µ(t) = 0 , t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞) . (3.14)
It remains to determine the path of µ(t) when the ceiling constraint binds.
We show in the Subsection 3.4 that µ(t) decreases during the period at the
ceiling so that µ(t) is single-peaked and the peak occurs at the precise time
at which the constraint begins binding.
Necessity of a post-ceiling period preceding the ultimate green period
If oil exploitation lasts at infinity, it is physically impossible to sustain
the mandated oil exploitation rate when at the ceiling, x¯, with a finite fossil
resource endowment. If oil exploitation is resumed in finite time, the oil ex-
ploitation rate should fall abruptly from x¯ to 0 at the end of the oil extraction
period if the ceiling period lasts until the complete transition to the ultimate
green period. Trying to compensate completely or partially this fall by an
abrupt increase of the renewable energy production will induce in all cases
either an abrupt fall of the energy surplus, either a fall of the food surplus
or either a joint fall of both surpluses, which cannot be optimal. Hence the
economy cannot switch directly from the period at the ceiling to the green
economy regime.
Proposition P. 3 Assume that along the optimal path, there exists a time
period at the ceiling, [tZ , t¯Z ], tZ < t¯Z, then there must also exist a post-ceiling
period of either infinite duration, (t¯Z ,∞), or either finite duration, (t¯Z , t¯x),
t¯Z < t¯x <∞, during which oil is exploited before the ultimate green period.
Proof: If the economy never stops using oil while remaining constrained
by the pollution ceiling, then x(t) = x¯, t ∈ [tZ ,∞), which is physically
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impossible with a finite oil endowment. If oil exploitation ends at some finite
date, t¯x, and the post-ceiling period does not exist, then t¯Z = t¯x ≡ t¯. Since
the optimal path of the shadow price of useful energy, pe(t), must be time
continuous at t¯, then u′e (ηx(t¯−))x¯+ ηy(t¯−)ymLy(t¯−)) = u′e(η˜yymL˜y), hence
η˜yL˜y − ηy(t¯−)Ly(t¯−) = ηx(t¯−)x¯/ym > 0, so that either L˜y − Ly(t¯−) > 0, or
η˜y − ηy(t¯−) > 0, or both, so that the case L˜y − Ly(t¯−) < 0 together with
η˜y − ηy(t¯−) < 0 must be excluded.
Assume first that L˜y − Ly(t¯−) > 0, equivalently that Lf (t¯−) > L˜f . Then
from (3.6): ηf (t¯−) < η˜f and b′f (η˜f ) > b′f (ηf (t¯−)) as illustrated in Figure 1,
so that u′f would jump upward at t = t¯, contradicting the time continuity of
the optimal path of the food price, pf (t).
Assume now that η˜y−ηy(t¯−) > 0 and L˜y−Ly(t¯−) > 0. Thus Lf (t¯−) > L˜f .
Hence from (3.6), ηf (t¯−) > η˜f and b′f (η˜f ) < b′f (ηf (t¯−)) so that u′f would jump
downward, contradicting once again the time continuity of pf (t).
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Figure 3: Jump of u′f at time t¯. The case Lf (t¯−) > L˜f .
Un-burned oil
The Proposition 3 allows to determine the stock of un-burned oil, this
part, X˜, of the initial oil endowment too costly to exploit given the energy
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price p˜e, attained at the end of the transition phase to the green economy.
The determination of this stranded oil stock X˜ is illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Determination of the un-burned oil stock.
In Figure 4 the curves c(ηx, X˜) are the average cost curves of the oil
transformation industry at the end of the transition phase. The curves are
drawn as functions of ηx for given hypothetical levels X˜, X˜ ′ and X˜ ′′ of the
stranded stock. Note that the mining rent on the last oil grade X˜ which is
exploited must be nil. If not it would be worth exploiting an additional grade
X˜ − dX, dX > 0 and sufficiently small, at the energy price p˜e. Also since
the last phase of oil exploitation is unconstrained by the pollution ceiling,
then µ = 0 when oil exploitation ends. Thus the full average cost of oil
transformation into useful energy is given by c(ηx, X˜) =
[
a(X˜) + bx(ηx)
]
/ηx.
As shown at the beginning of the present sub-section the average cost
curves are U-shaped and cost minimization implies that the marginal cost
b′x(ηx) be equal to the minimum average cost. Hence the locus of the minima
of the average curves is the curve b′x(ηx). Clearly the larger is X˜ the lower
is located the curve c(ηx, X˜) since a(X) is a decreasing function of X. Also
the larger is X˜ the lower is the transformation rate η˜x at which c(ηx, X˜) is
minimum since this minimum is located on the increasing curve b′x(ηx). In
the Figure 2 the curve c(ηx, X˜ ′′) is located under the curve c(ηx, X˜ ′), itself
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located under the curve c(ηx, X˜), because X˜ < X˜ ′ < X˜ ′′. Thus the minimum
of c(ηx, X˜ ′′) is smaller than the minimum of c(ηx, X˜ ′) itself smaller than the
minimum of c(ηx, X˜), and η˜′′x < η˜′x < η˜x is the ranking of ηx at which the
minima are attained.
Last the energy price at the end of oil exploitation is the price p˜e of the
green economy because the price path is continuous, and the marginal cost
of the oil transformation industry must be equal to this price. Hence η˜x is
given as the solution of p˜e = b′x(ηx). The stranded stock X˜ is this stock for
which the average cost c(ηx, X˜) is minimum at ηx = η˜x. Hence X˜ is given
as the solution of p˜e = [a(X) + bx(η˜x)] /η˜x. In Figure 2, to the hypothetical
green energy prices p˜e, p˜′e and p˜′′e , p˜′′e < p˜′e < p˜e, correspond the respective
transformation rates η˜x, η˜′x and η˜′′x, η˜′′x < η˜′x < η˜x and the un-burned oil stocks
X˜, X˜ ′ and X˜ ′′, X˜ ′′ < X˜ ′ < X˜.
It must be noted that the un-burned stock does not depend upon the
pollution ceiling Z¯ but only upon the conditions prevailing in the ultimate
green economy.28 Note also that the determination of X˜ follows the same
logic whether the economy converges in finite time toward the green economy
regime or only asymptotically.
3.3 Periods of unconstrained oil exploitation
To characterize the dynamics of the different variables during the transition,
it is useful to distinguish the periods of unconstrained oil exploitation from
the period of constrained oil exploitation. During the unconstrained periods,
the path of the shadow cost of pollution is characterized by (3.13) and (3.14).
During the constrained period, only the oil extraction rate is known, x(t) = x¯.
The following proposition presents what happens when oil exploitation is
not constrained by the cap on the pollution stock.
Proposition P. 4 Along the optimal path, during the periods of unconstrained
exploitation, t 6∈ (tZ , t¯Z):
28However with a technical progress modifying the functions a(.) or bi(.), i = x, y, f ,
different pollution ceilings would have ambiguous effects on X˜.
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a. Irrespective of oil is the only exploited resource or both oil and solar
energy are exploited:
a.i. The production of useful energy decreases and its price increases;
a.ii. The production of useful oil energy decreases and the transforma-
tion rate of extracted oil into useful energy increases, hence the
production of extracted oil decreases.
b. If both oil and solar energies are exploited:
b.i. The useful solar energy production increases due to both the in-
crease of the land acreage allocated to the production of this energy
and the increase of the transformation rate of solar energy into
useful energy;
b.ii. The land acreage allocated to food production decreases and the
food productivity of land increases but not sufficiently to compen-
sate for the acreage decrease so that the food production decreases
and its price increases;
b.iii. The land rent increases.
A formal proof of the above claims is given in Appendix A.3, we now
sketch the rationale of the Proposition 4. The f.o.c (3.2): pe = b′x(ηx) defines
ηpx(pe), the optimal transformation rate of oil, as an increasing function of
pe. Let vx(pe) ≡ peηpx(pe)− bx(ηpx(pe)) denote the gross margin on oil energy
transformation per unit of processed oil, an increasing function of pe.
Since θ(t) increases throughout the whole oil exploitation phase (c.f.
(3.12)) and µ(t) is either nil after t¯Z , or time increasing before tZ , (c.f. (3.13)
and (3.14)), the full shadow cost of oil energy strictly increases during any
period of unconstrained oil exploitation. Optimality requires the equaliza-
tion of the unitary gross margin on oil transformation to the full shadow cost
of oil: vx(pe) = θ + ζµ (c.f. (3.1)). This implies that the useful energy price
should increase during unconstrained periods. If oil is the only exploited
energy source, the increasing trend of the useful energy price means both an
increasing trend of the conversion rate of oil energy and a decreasing trend
of useful energy production, thus the oil consumption rate decreases.
When both energy sources are exploited, we have shown previously that
an increase of the useful energy price induces an increase of the solar energy
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production rate, an increase resulting from the increase of the solar energy
conversion performance and the expansion of the land acreage devoted to
this activity. Thus the solar sector should increase its energy supply, im-
plying a fall of the energy production rate from the oil sector. Optimality
requires a smooth substitution between oil energy and solar energy, the solar
sector benefiting from an increasing competitiveness advantage with respect
to the oil sector because of the increasing cost trend of oil extraction and the
increasing trend of the carbon pollution shadow cost before the constrained
period.
The energy conversion performance of the oil sector being increasing
thank to the energy price increase, the fall of the oil useful energy supply
implies that the oil consumption rate should decrease. Last, the solar land
acreage increase implies a progressive decline of the land acreage devoted to
food production, an increase of the land rent and thus a food price increase,
together with an increasing trend of the productivity of food production.
3.4 Periods of constrained oil exploitation
During the constrained period, the dynamics of µ is not yet known because
µ˙ = (ρ + α)µ − ν and ν > 0 since the constraint Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 binds. At
this stage, the only qualitative information that we have is that θ˙(t) > 0 (c.f.
(3.12)) and x˙(t) = 0 since x(t) = x¯.
The following Proposition 5 shows that although the oil use as an input
in the useful energy production is constrained by the pollution stock upper
bound, it is optimal to undertake no additional effort to push away the
limits of the energy consumption and relax the constraint, either directly
by improving the conversion rates in the energy transformations sectors, or
indirectly, by improving the productivity rate in the food sector which would
allow allocating more land to the renewable energy production. We call this
rather counterintuitive result the Ceiling Efficiency Paradox.29
29The same kind of paradox holds when the pollution flow can be abated. The fraction
of the abated pollution flow is constant within the period at the ceiling. See Amigues and
Moreaux, 2016-b.
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Proposition P. 5 Ceiling Efficiency Paradox.
Along the optimal path, whether oil is the only exploited energy or both
oil and solar energies are simultaneously exploited, the economy moves along
a stationary trajectory during the period at the ceiling: Efficiency rates, land
productivity, production levels of extracted oil, useful energies and food, and
the land allocation are all constant. The only changes come from the increase
of the full marginal cost of extracted oil, exactly balanced by the decrease of
the shadow marginal cost of the pollution stock, so that the full marginal cost
of the useful oil energy is constant. The other costs, the marginal cost of the
solar energy when exploited and the marginal cost of food, the prices of the
useful energy and food, and the land rent are all constant.
An immediate implication of the Proposition 5 is the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Along the optimal path the solar energy begins to be exploited
either before the arrival at the ceiling or after the end of the period at the
ceiling, but never within the period.
A formal proof of the Proposition 5 is given in Appendix, we sketch now
its main rationale. A cap on the admissible atmospheric carbon concentra-
tion implies a constant rate of carbon emissions and thus a constant rate of
exploitation of fossil fuels, absent any abatement option. This is a general
property of ceiling models not resulting from our simplifying assumption of
a constant self-regeneration rate of carbon in the atmosphere. Any law of
motion of the atmospheric carbon concentration of the form Z˙ = G(ζx, Z)
should admit under mild assumptions a unique root, x¯, of the equation
G(ζx, Z¯) = 0 when the economy faces the carbon cap. There thus exists
an equivalence between a constraint on carbon concentrations and a global
constraint on carbon emissions.
However such an equivalence holds only during the time period at the
ceiling [tZ , t¯Z). Clearly the pollution flow, ζx(t), must be larger than αZ¯
before tZ . To obtain the path solution of the problem (S.P.) as the solution
of a problem framed in terms of a constraint on the pollution flow, not only
the cap on the flow must be specified, here αZ¯, but also the time interval
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during which the pollution constraint binds, here [tZ , t¯Z).30
The main implication of the constancy of the admissible pollution flow,
and thus of the fossil fuel consumption rate, during the constrained period
is that the optimal levels of the variables are solution of a time independent
static optimization problem. Hence these optimal levels are constant during
the constrained phase, what we call the ’ceiling efficiency paradox’.
To get an explanation of the paradox, skip the renewable energy sector
and assume that the economy uses only oil to produce useful energy. Then
we may reformulate the optimal choices of the oil sector at any time t of the
constrained period as a static problem in which first, the average full cost of
the oil input, θ(t), is given and is independent of x, and second the amount
of oil transformed is bounded from above by x¯, the equivalent of the ceiling
constraint Z¯ −Z ≥ 0, a state variable constraint translated into a command
variable or flow constraint variable. Hence the following problem:
max
ηx,x
ue(ηxx)− θ(t)x− bx(ηx)x
s.t. x¯− x ≥ 0 and x ≥ 0 .
Let γ¯x(t) and γx(t) be the multipliers associated to the maximum and mini-
mum oil use constraints. The f.o.c’s of the problem read:
w.r.t. x : u′e(ηxx)ηx = θ(t) + bx(ηx) + γ¯x(t)− γx(t) ;
γ¯x(t)(x¯− x) = γx(t)x = 0 ; γ¯x(t), γx(t) ≥ 0 (3.15)
w.r.t. ηx : u
′
e(ηxx)x = b
′
x(ηx)x− γηx(t) ; γηx(t)ηx = 0 . (3.16)
Assuming that the ceiling constraint is tight means that x = x¯, hence only
one command variable has to be determined, the efficiency rate ηx. For x = x¯
and γηx(t) = 0 because ηx > 0, the f.o.c ( 3.16) relative to ηx reduces to the
following one variable equation:
u′e(ηxx¯) = b
′
x(ηx) .
As illustrated in Figure 5, this equation has a unique solution η¯x.
30Other kinds of constraints and their effects on the pollution path have been explored
by Saltari and Travaglino, 2016. In their partial equilibrium model, the planning horizon
is finite, the pollution stock at the end of the planning period is given and there is a cap
on the growth rate of the pollution flow of the form Z˙(t) ≤ rZ(t), 0 < r < 1, in our
notations. However, they do not model explicitly the use of different types of energies.
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Figure 5: Determination of the constant efficiency rate η¯x of the oil
transformation industry during the period at the ceiling.
Thus during the constrained period the choice of the optimal transfor-
mation rate ηx depends upon x¯, equivalently upon Z¯, but not upon θ(t) the
only dynamic parameter of the problem. Next fixing x and ηx in the f.o.c
(3.15) relative to x, we get:
u′e(η¯xx¯)η¯x = θ(t) + bx(η¯x) + γ¯x(t) =⇒
dγ¯x
dt
= −θ˙(t) . (3.17)
Here θ(t)+ γ¯x(t) is the equivalent of a (X(t))+λ(t)+ ζµ(t) = θ(t)+ ζµ(t)
in the f.o.c (3.1) relative to x, of the (S.P ) problem, that is γ¯x(t) = ζµ(t).
Since θ˙(t) = ρλ(t) (c.f. (3.12)) then:
µ˙(t) =
1
ζ
dγ¯(t)
dt
= −ρ
ζ
λ(t) < 0 , t ∈ (tZ , t¯Z) .
If the ceiling constraint is not tight the two above f.o.c. equations must be
solved simultaneously, γ¯x(t) = 0, and now their solution depends upon θ(t).
As time goes on, before the arrival at the ceiling, µ(t) increases because
the date at which the constraint will become active is closer and closer. Once
at the ceiling µ(t) decreases because now it is the date at which the constraint
will end to be effective that becomes closer and closer.
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Entering the solar energy inside the picture does not change fundamen-
tally the problem. Assume now that the land acreage devoted to the pro-
duction of useful energy must be at most equal to some given area L¯ − Lf .
The energy problem becomes:
max
ηx, x
ηy, Ly
ue (ηxx+ ηyy
mLy)− θ(t)x− bx(ηx)x− by(ηy)ymLy
s.t. x¯− x ≥ 0 , x ≥ 0 , (L¯− Lf)− Ly ≥ 0 and Ly ≥ 0 .
Denote by γ¯y(t) and γy(t) the multipliers associated to the constraints on
Ly. The f.o.c’s read now:
w.r.t. x : u′e(ηxx+ ηyy
mLy)ηx = θ(t) + b(ηx) + γ¯x(t)− γx(t) (3.18)
w.r.t. ηx : u
′
e(ηxx+ ηyy
mLy)x = b
′
x(ηx)x− γηx(t) (3.19)
w.r.t. Ly : u
′
e(ηxx+ ηyy
mLy)ηy = by(ηy)ηy + γ¯y(t)− γy(t) (3.20)
w.r.t. ηy : u
′
e(ηxx+ ηyy
mLy)y
mLy = b
′
y(ηy)y
mLy − γηy(t) . (3.21)
When both the ceiling constraint and the maximum land surface constraint
are active, (3.19) and (3.21) reduce to:
u′e
(
ηxx¯+ ηyy
m(L¯− Lf )
)
= b′x(ηx) (3.22)
u′e
(
ηxx¯+ ηyy
m(L¯− Lf )
)
= b′y(ηy) . (3.23)
Although now ηx and ηy are simultaneously determined they do not depend
upon θ(t). Denoting by (η¯x, η¯y) the solution of (3.22)-(3.23), we get the
equivalent of (3.17) in the present context:
u′e
(
η¯xx¯+ η¯yy
m(L¯− Lf )
)
= θ(t) + bx(η¯x) + γ¯x(t) =⇒ dγ¯x(t)
dt
= −θ˙(t) .
(3.24)
To close this section, the following Proposition 6 describes the conse-
quences of a stricter environmental constraint on the model variables during
the ceiling period.
Proposition P. 6 A more stringent climate constraint, that is a lower Z¯,
or equivalently a stricter carbon emission allowance during the constrained
period, dx¯ < 0, has the following effects:
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. If the economy consumes only oil energy when the constraint binds,
it increases the conversion rate of fossil energy, dη¯x > 0, raises the
energy price, dp¯e > 0 and reduces the energy consumption rate, dq¯e =
dq¯x < 0. The food sector is unaffected by a change of the environmental
constraint.
. If the economy uses both energy sources when the constraint binds, a
lower mandated emission rate, dx¯ < 0:
- Increases the conversion rates of both fossil and renewable ener-
gies, dη¯x > 0 and dη¯y > 0.
- Increases the energy price, dp¯e > 0, and reduces the energy sup-
ply dqe < 0. A stricter environmental constraint favours the en-
ergy transition from fossil energy to renewable energy. The energy
consumption from the fossil source decreases, dq¯x < 0, while the
renewable energy consumption increases, dq¯y > 0.
- Increases the land acreage allocated to renewable energy produc-
tion, dL¯y > 0, the food land acreage being reduced by the same
amount, dL¯f = −dL¯y < 0.
- Increases the land rent, dp¯i > 0, inducing a rise of the food pro-
ductivity, dηf > 0, together with a higher food price, dp¯f > 0, and
a lower food consumption rate, dq¯f < 0.
When the economy consumes only fossil energy, the proof of the claims of
the Proposition 6 is straightforward. Differentiating (3.2): u′e(ηxx¯) = b′(ηx)
yields:
dηx
dx¯
=
ηxu
′′
e(qe)
b′′(ηx)− x¯u′′e(qe)
< 0 .
Thus a tighter constraint, dx¯ < 0, induces a more efficient transformation,
dηx > 0, however not sufficient to compensate the input reduction, since by
(3.2) again, dpe/dx¯ = b′′x(ηx)dηx/dx¯ > 0, hence dqe/dx¯ < 0, the energy price
is increased and the energy consumption is decreased.
When the economy uses both energies, a stricter environmental constraint
requires to adjust all productivities in the energy and the food sector together
with reallocating the land between energy and food production. We provide
a formal proof of the proposition in Appendix A.5.
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4 Optimal paths
All the optimal paths share a common strong qualitative structure deter-
mined by the increasing scarcity of the non-renewable resource and the ceiling
constraint when this constraint is effective. Putting together the results of
the Propositions 1 to 5 with the time continuity of the shadow price paths,
a necessary condition for optimality in the present context, Proposition 7
characterizes the optimal paths.
Proposition P. 7 Assuming a sufficiently large initial oil endowment and/or
a sufficiently low atmospheric pollution ceiling, any optimal path is a sequence
of at most four main periods:
- A first period of decreasing oil extraction and decreasing energy con-
sumption, increasing efficiency of the oil transformation, increasing at-
mospheric pollution and increasing shadow cost of carbon;
- A second period of constant oil extraction and energy consumption and
constant efficiency of the oil transformation industry, a constant atmo-
spheric pollution stock at the ceiling and a decreasing pollution shadow
cost;
- A third period similar to the first one excepted that now the pollution
stock, although not necessarily monotonically decreasing, never comes
back to its ceiling level, hence a nil carbon shadow cost;
- A fourth and ultimate green period of infinite duration. This regime
can be attained only asymptotically if oil exploitation lasts forever.
- Depending on the cost functions, the production of renewable energy
may begin either within the first period, possibly from t = 0, or within
the third one, but never during the second period of binding pollution
constraint.
Once the production of renewable energy starts, the land devoted to its
production and the efficiency of the transformation increase hence also its
production rate till the ultimate green economy. If the renewable energy
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production begins during the first phase, the acreage allocated to energy
production and the transformation efficiency rate are kept constant during
the ceiling period, hence also the renewable energy production. Correlatively
when the land allocated to food production decreases and although the effi-
ciency of the food sector increases, the food production decreases.
The different components of an optimal path along which the renewable
energy begins to be exploited within the first period are illustrated in Figures
6, 7, and 8 for the case of a finite period of oil exploitation.31
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Figure 6: Optimal price paths:
Top: Useful energy price
Bottom: Food price.
31Note that, as shown in the Figure 8, the land rent per unit of food, pi/ηf , being equal
to u′ − bf/ηf = b′f − bf/ηf , through (3.5) and (3.6), is an increasing function of ηf and
thus of time during the unconstrained exploitation periods.
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Figure 7: Paths of efficiency and productivity rates:
Top: Efficiency rate in the oil transformation industry
Middle: Efficiency rate in the solar energy sector
Bottom: Productivity rate in the food sector.
5 Concluding remarks and the robustness of
the ceiling paradox
Facing increasingly costly fossil fuels and the more and more stringent pol-
lution problems raised by their exploitation, the economy should improve
the efficiency of useful energy production from any primary source, fossils or
renewables. However, efficiency gains come at a cost. This does not prevent
renewables to take progressively a larger share in the energy mix while ex-
panding their land use. Under standard assumptions on costs and demands,
the development of renewables is both an intensive process, through con-
tinuous efficiency gains, and an extensive one, through a larger occupation
of space. Being in competition for land access with renewables, the food
production sector intensifies its activity on less land but not sufficiently to
counterbalance the acreage decrease. Hence the food output decreases and
the food prices increase.
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Figure 8: Paths of land allocation and land rent:
Top: Land allocation
Bottom: Land rent.
The above dynamics of the energy and food sectors stops when the econ-
omy is actually constrained by the cap on the atmospheric carbon concen-
tration. The cap implies a constant rate of exploitation of fossil fuels, absent
any abatement option. Facing a constant supply of extracted fossils, the
transformation industry makes no more any effort to improve its conversion
efficiency performance and delivers useful energy at a constant rate. The
energy price being now constant, the renewables sector also stops making
efficiency gains and increasing its land occupation.
In a decentralized economy in which the pollution problem is the only
externality, the first best can be reached through a carbon pricing scheme
that adds the shadow cost of carbon to the useful energy price. The analysis
shows that the carbon price should rise before the attainment of the ceiling.
However, during the ceiling period, the carbon price must decline in order
to keep constant the net surplus from fossil fuels exploitation, just balancing
the rise of the full marginal cost of extracted fossil fuels, the sum of their
extraction cost and mining rent.
The energy price and the food price are positively correlated because of
the competition for land. Introducing a carbon price will raise the food price
and reduce the food supply when both oil and solar energy are supplied.
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The carbon price increasing the competitiveness of solar energy with respect
to fossil fuels, this competitiveness improvement increases the comparative
advantage of solar energy production over food production in terms of land
valuation.
The ceiling paradox is robust to alternative structures of the surplus func-
tion. We have assumed first that food and energy are substitutes and that
the surplus function is additively separable and second, that oil and solar
energy are perfect substitutes. Although the food-energy substituability as-
sumption is empirically the most pertinent one, the separability assump-
tion could be judged as excessively strong. Let us assume a surplus func-
tion u(qe, qf ) and a perfect substitution between oil and solar useful ener-
gies, hence qe = ηx + ηyymLy and qf = ηfLf . Then the f.o.c’s (3.1)-(3.4)
would have to be rewritten with ∂u (ηxx+ ηyymLy, ηfLf ) /∂qe substituted
for u′e(ηxx+ηyymLy) and the f.o.c’s (3.5)-(3.6) with ∂u (ηxx+ ηyymLy, ηfLf )
substituted for u′f (ηfLf ). For x = x¯ the new conditions (3.2)-(3.6) together
with the constraint L¯ − Ly − Lf ≥ 0 determine some η¯x, η¯y, η¯f , L¯f , L¯y
and p¯i, satisfying all the f.o.c’s and the land availability constraint. The new
condition (3.1) would read:
∂u
(
η¯xx¯+ η¯yy
mL¯y, η¯yL¯f
)
∂qe
η¯x = θ(t) + ζµ(t) + bx(η¯x) .
This condition is satisfied provided that θ(t) + ζµ(t) be constant and equal
to (∂u/∂qe)η¯x − bx(η¯x), hence µ˙(t) = −θ˙(t)/ζ < 0, as in the case of separa-
bility. Again the carbon price is maximum at the beginning of the period
at the ceiling and during this time period, the energy transformation rates
ηx, ηy and ηf must be kept constant together with the land allocation, Ly
and Lf , between energy and food production. However during the uncon-
strained phases the dynamics is much more complex depending upon the
strength of the food energy substituability, captured by the absolute value
of ∂2u/∂ql∂qf < 0.
The other problem is the probably imperfect substituability between oil
and solar useful energies. The case in which each type of useful energy
generates independent surpluses is an extreme example of such imperfect
substitutability. To keep the matter as simple as possible let us also assume
that energy and food generate independent surpluses, so that the gross sur-
plus function may be written as u(qx, qy, qf ) = uex(qx) + uey(qy) + uf (qf ) the
functions uex, uey and uf all satisfying the assumption A.1. The direct link
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between the valuation of the two energy sources is now broken. Denoting
pex ≡ u′ex(qx) and pey ≡ u′ey(qy), the equivalents of (3.1)-(3.4) during a time
period of simultaneous exploitation of the two energies read:
pexηx = θ + ζµ+ bx(ηx) and pex = b′x(ηx)
peyηyy
m = by(ηy)y
m + pi and pey = b′y(ηy) .
The two first relations determine pex, ηx and thus qx and x as functions
of the full shadow cost of oil energy, θ + ζµ alone. On the other hand, the
two last relations together with the optimality conditions in the food sector
determine some land allocation between food and solar energy production.
During unconstrained time periods, the oil sector will improve its energy
conversion efficiency, and reduce the supply of oil energy. During constrained
periods, the fixed supply of oil will induce a constant energy conversion rate
and thus a constant useful oil energy supply. In contrast, the solar energy
sector will produce at a forever constant rate during any type of time periods,
with a constant transformation rate, inducing a constant food price and a
constant food supply and food productivity. Imperfect substitution between
fossil and renewable energy at the end-users stage attenuates the positive
impact of carbon pricing on the food price under land access competition.32
Concerning the energy supply side of the model, the assumption of a
cost free reallocation of land to food and energy production may appear as
an extreme assumption. Converting land from food to energy production
is generally costly, the conversion cost rising with the speed of conversion,
equivalently we mean that the instantaneous conversion cost is an increasing
and convex function of the conversion rate L˙y(t) = −L˙f (t). The result should
be a dampening of the speed of the conversion rate during the unconstrained
phases. However taking care that the derivative of the adjustment cost func-
tion should be strictly positive at L˙ = 0+, because converting any piece of
land, however small, requires costly inputs, it is not clear that the conversion
process should be stopped once at the ceiling and not be restarted, if closed,
before the end of the phase at the ceiling (see Amigues et al., (2015) for such
effects in another context).
Thus the potential supply of renewable resource ymLy could not be con-
stant during the phase at the ceiling because the conversion process has to
32See Long, 2013, for a thorough study of the imperfect substitution between energies
issue.
36
be smoothed. An extreme case of such an inherently dampening process is
the minimum time-to-build case explored by Kydland and Prescott (1982).
We leave these problems for further research.
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Appendix
A.1 A production structure interpretation of
the assumption A.3.
Let fi be the production function of the transformation sector i:
qi = fi(hi,mi,1, · · · ,mi,j, · · · ,mi,J) i = x, y, f ,
where hx = x for the oil transformation sector, hy = Lyym for the solar
transformation sector, hf = Lf for the food sector and mi,j, i = x, y, f ,
j = 1, · · · , J , are the other production factors. Assume that fi is homogenous
of degree 1, hence may be rewritten as:
qi = hifi(1, zi,1, · · · , zi,j, · · · , zi,J) i = x, y, f ,
where zi,j = mi,j/hi and denote by ηi(zi,1, · · · , zi,J) the function fi(1, zi,1, · · · , zi,J).
The function ηi(.) is assumed twice continuously differentiable with ηi(0) = 0,
ηi ≤ ηˆi, ∂ηi/∂zj > 0 and strictly concave. Let (p1, · · · , pj, · · · , pJ) be the in-
put price vector assumed constant throughout time for simplicity. Then bi(ηi)
is the cost function resulting from the expenditure minimization problem:
min
J∑
j=1
pjzi,j
s.t. ηi(zi,1, · · · , zi,j, · · · , zi,J)− ηi ≥ 0
zi,j ≥ 0, j = 1, · · · , J .
The assumption A.3 results from the assumptions on the ηi(.) functions,
i = x, y, f .
A.2 Proofs of the Propositions 1 and 2
Let L∗y, L∗y ∈ [0, L¯), be the optimal acreage of land devoted to energy pro-
duction, then the optimal management of the food sector is this pair (ηf , Lf )
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solving the following food sector problem (F.S.P ):33
(F.S.P ) maxηf ,Lf uf (ηfLf )− bf (ηf )Lf
s.t. L¯− L∗y − Lf ≥ 0 .
Denote by pi the multiplier associated to the land availability constraint and
by Lf the Lagrangian:
Lf = uf (ηfLf )− bf (ηf )Lf + pi
[
L¯− L∗y − Lf
]
.
The f.o.c’s are:
∂Lf
∂ηf
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ηfLf ) = b′f (ηf ) , (A.2.1)
∂Lf
∂Lf
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ηfLf ) ηf = bf (ηf ) + pi , (A.2.2)
together with the complementary slackness condition:
pi ≥ 0 , L¯− L∗y − Lf ≥ 0 and pi
[
L¯− L∗y − Lf
]
= 0 . (A.2.3)
Let (η∗f , L∗f , pi∗) be a solution of the system (A.2.1)-(A.2.3) such that pi∗ =
0 so that (A.2.2) may be simplified to get u′f
(
η∗fL
∗
f
)
= bf (η
∗
f )/η
∗
f , hence by
(A.2.1): b′f (η∗f ) = bf (η∗f )/η∗f . However according to A.3: b′f (ηf ) > bf (ηf )/ηf
for all ηf ∈ (0, ηˆf ), hence for η∗f , a contradiction.
Without the separability assumption, it must be pointed out that the
problem (F.S.P ) would have to be written as :
(F.S.P ) maxηf ,Lf u (qe(t), ηfLf )− bf (ηf )Lf
s.t. L¯− L∗y − Lf ≥ 0 .
The f.o.c’s would be now:
∂u (qe(t), qf (t))
∂qf (t)
= b′f (ηf (t)) (A.2.4)
∂u (qe(t), qf (t))
∂qf (t)
ηf (t) = bf (ηf (t)) + pi(t) . (A.2.5)
Without the separability assumption, ∂2u/∂qe∂qf 6= 0, hence (A.2.4) and
(A.2.5) cannot be reduced to (A.2.1) and (A.2.2). With Ly held constant,
but not qe(t), Lf would be constant because Proposition 1 still holds, but
the productivity in the food sector would be no more constant.
33We neglect the non-negativity constraints on ηf , Lf and the upper bound constraint
on ηf , all of which are satisfied.
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A.3 Proof of the Proposition 4
Let us start from the f.o.c’s (3.1) and (3.2) written as follows:
u′e(qe)ηx = θ + bx(ηx) + ζµ (A.3.1)
u′e(qe) = b
′
x(ηx) . (A.3.2)
Time differentiating (A.3.1), using (3.12), (3.13) and (A.3.2), we obtain
q˙e(t) =
ρλ(t) + ζ(ρ+ α)µ(t)
u′′e(qe(t))ηx(t)
< 0 with µ(t) > 0 if t ≤ tZ
and µ(t) = 0 if t ≥ t¯Z .(A.3.3)
Time differentiating (A.3.2) and making use of (A.3.3), yield
η˙x(t) =
u′′e(qe(t))
b′′x(ηx(t))
q˙e(t) > 0 , t 6∈ (tZ , t¯Z) . (A.3.4)
Only oil is exploited
In this case: qe = ηxx, hence
x˙(t) =
1
ηx(t)
(q˙e(t)− η˙x(t)x(t)) < 0 . (A.3.5)
Both energy resources are exploited
Since now Ly > 0 and ηy > 0, then we may write (3.4) as follows: u′e(qe) =
b′y(ηy). Time differentiating and making use of (A.3.3), we obtain
η˙y(t) =
u′′e(qe(t))
b′′y(ηy(t))
q˙e(t) > 0 , t 6∈ (tZ , t¯Z) . (A.3.6)
Since Ly > 0, then (3.3) may be written as: (u′e(qe)ηy − by(ηy)) ym = pi.
Again time differentiating, then by (A.3.3) and (3.4), u′e − b′y = 0, we get
p˙i(t) = u′′e(qe(t))ηy(t)y
mq˙e(t) > 0 , t 6∈ (tZ , t¯Z) . (A.3.7)
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Last, consider the food sub-system (3.5)-(3.6):
u′f (ηfLf )ηf = bf (ηf ) + pi
u′f (ηfLf ) = b
′
f (ηf ) .
Time differentiating and using (3.6), u′f − b′f = 0, we can express η˙f and L˙f
as the following functions of p˙i u′′fηfLf u′′fη2f
u′′fLf − b′′f u′′fηf
 η˙f
L˙f
 =
 p˙i
0
 .
Hence, for t 6∈ (tZ , t¯Z)
η˙f (t) =
1
b′′f (ηf (t))ηf (t)
p˙i(t) > 0 , (A.3.8)
L˙f (t) = −
u′′f (qf (t))Lf (t)− b′′f (ηf (t))
u′′f (qf (t))b
′′
f (ηf (t))η
2
f (t)
p˙i(t) < 0 , (A.3.9)
q˙f (t) =
1
u′′f (qf (t))ηf (t)
p˙i(t) < 0 , (A.3.10)
L˙y(t) > 0 and q˙y(t) = ηy(t)L˙y(t) + η˙y(t)Ly(t) > 0 , (A.3.11)
q˙x(t) = q˙e(t)− q˙y(t) < 0 and x˙(t) = 1
ηx(t)
[q˙x(t)− η˙x(t)x(t)] < 0 ,
(A.3.12)
which complete the proof of the claims of the Proposition 4.
A.4 Proof of the Proposition 5
To characterize the constrained period, we express the yet unknown dynamics
as functions of the only known dynamics, θ˙ > 0, taking care that x˙ = 0. We
may have two types of constrained oil exploitation periods according to solar
energy is simultaneously exploited with oil or not.
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A.4.1 Exclusive exploitation of oil: qe = qx = ηxx¯
Let us start from the f.o.c’s (3.1) and (3.2) written now as follows:
u′e(ηxx¯)ηx = θ + bx(ηx) + ζµ (A.4.1)
u′e(ηxx¯) = b
′
x(ηx) . (A.4.2)
Time differentiating and using u′e − b′x = 0, we obtain the following system: u′′e x¯ηx −ζ
u′′e x¯− b′′x 0
 η˙x
µ˙
 =
 θ˙
0
 .
Hence
η˙x(t) = 0 and µ˙(t) = −1
ζ
θ˙(t) < 0 , t ∈ (tZ , t¯Z) . (A.4.3)
Let us denote by η¯x the constant level of the efficiency rate ηx. Then qe is
constant, qe(t) = qx(t) = η¯xx¯, and also the price of useful energy: pe(t) =
p¯e = u
′
e(η¯xx¯).
The increase of the full marginal cost of the extracted oil is exactly bal-
anced by the decrease of the shadow marginal cost of the pollution stock:
θ˙(t) + ζµ˙(t) = 0. The full marginal cost of useful energy, the input cost of
the oil transformation industry, is constant and equal to b′x(η¯x), itself equal
to p¯e.
A.4.2 Simultaneous exploitation of both oil and solar
energies
Writing Lf as L¯ − Ly, and using the same methodology we determine now
η˙x, η˙y, L˙y, µ˙, η˙f and p˙i as functions of θ˙.
Let us consider the system of the six f.o.c’s obtained after some simplifi-
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cations and substitution of L¯− Ly for Lf :
u′e (ηxx¯+ ηyy
mLy) ηx = θ + bx(ηx) + ζµ (A.4.4)
u′e (ηxx¯+ ηyy
mLy) = b
′
x(ηx) (A.4.5)
u′e (ηxx¯+ ηyy
mLy) = b
′
y(ηy) (A.4.6)
u′e (ηxx¯+ ηyy
mLy) ηyy
m = by(ηy)y
m + pi (A.4.7)
u′f
(
ηf
[
L¯− Ly
])
= b′f (ηf ) (A.4.8)
u′f
(
ηf
[
L¯− Ly
])
ηf = bf (ηf ) + pi . (A.4.9)
Time differentiating results in the following system: M
; −ζ
; 0
; 0
; 0
; 0
; 0


η˙x
η˙y
L˙y
η˙f
p˙i
µ˙
 =

θ˙
0
0
0
0
0
 , (A.4.10)
where M is a 5 × 6 sub-matrix the details of which are given in the below
subsection.
Let us denote by ∆ the determinant of the system and by ∆(k,l) the
sub-determinant obtained by deleting the kth line and the lth column. Thus
∆ = ζ∆(1,6). Note that ∆(1,l) = 0, for l = 1, · · · , 5, so that
η˙x(t) = η˙y(t) = L˙y(t) = η˙f (t) = p˙i(t) = 0
and µ˙(t) = −1
ζ
θ˙(t) , t ∈ (tZ , t¯Z) , (A.4.11)
showing the claims of the Proposition 5.
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A.4.3 Details of the matrix M of equation (A.4.10)
M
≡
                 u
′′ ex¯
η x
u
′′ eη
x
y
m
L
y
u
′′ eη
x
η y
y
m
0
0
u
′′ ex¯
−
b′
′ x
u
′′ ey
m
L
y
u
′′ eη
y
y
m
0
0
u
′′ ex¯
−
b′
′ y
u
′′ ey
m
L
y
u
′′ eη
y
y
m
0
0
u
′′ ex¯
η y
y
m
u
′′ eη
y
(y
m
)2
u
′′ e(
η y
y
m
)2
0
−1
0
0
−u
′′ fη
f
u
′′ f
[ L¯−
L
y
] −b
′′ f
0
0
0
−u
′′ fη
2 f
u
′ f
+
u
′′ fq
f
−
b′
′ f
−1
                 
A.5 Proof of the Proposition 6
We focus on the case of simultaneous exploitation of both energies. Through
(3.2) and (3.4): b′x(ηx) = b′y(ηy) we get by differentiating:
dηy
dηx
=
b′′x(ηx)
b′′y(ηy)
> 0 . (A.5.1)
Next, we identify the sensitivity of the energy land acreage, Ly, to the fossil
energy transformation rate by the following argument. Through (3.2) once
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again, we get dpe/dηx = b′′x(ηx) > 0, thus (3.11) yields
vy(pe) = pi = vf (pf ) =⇒ dpi
dηx
= ηyb
′′(ηx) > 0 and
dpf
dηx
=
ηy
ηf
b′′x(ηx) > 0 .
(A.5.2)
Taking (3.6) into account: dpf = b′′f (ηf )dηf and dpf = u′′f (qf )dqf imply
that:
dηf
dηx
=
1
b′′f (ηf )
dpf
dηx
=
ηyb
′′
x(ηx)
ηfb′′f (ηf )
> 0 (A.5.3)
dqf
dηx
=
1
u′′f (qf )
dpf
dηx
=
ηyb
′′
x(ηx)
ηfu′′f (qf )b′′x(ηx)
< 0 (A.5.4)
Thus:
dqf
dηx
=
dηf
dηx
Lf + ηf
dLf
dηx
=⇒ dLy
dηx
= −dLf
dηx
= − 1
ηf
[
dqf
dηx
− dηf
dηx
Lf
]
= − 1
ηf
[
ηyb
′′
x(ηx)
ηfu′′f (qf )b′′x(ηx)
− ηyb
′′
x(ηx)
ηfb′′f (ηf )
Lf
]
> 0 (A.5.5)
Making use of (A.5.1), (A.5.5) and (3.2):
u′e(ηxx¯+ ηyLyy
m) = b′x(ηx)
=⇒ u′′e(qe) [dηxx¯+ ηxdx¯+ dηyLyym + ηydLyym] = b′′x(ηx)dηx
⇐⇒ u′′e(qe)ηxdx¯ =
{
b′′x(ηx)− u′′e(qe)
[
x¯+
dηy
dηx
Lyy
m + ηy
dLy
dηx
ym
]}
dηx
⇐⇒ dηx
dx¯
=
ηx
(<0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
u′′e(qe)b
′′
x(ηx)− u′′e(qe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(<0)
x¯+ dηydηx︸︷︷︸
(>0)
Lyy
m + ηy
dLy
dηx︸︷︷︸
(>0)
ym

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(>0)
< 0 .
Taking (3.2), (A.5.1), (A.5.2), (A.5.3), (A.5.4) and (A.5.5) into account
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yields:
dηy
dx¯
< 0 ;
dLy
dx¯
< 0 ;
dpe
dx¯
< 0 ;
dqe
dx¯
> 0 ;
dqx
dx¯
> 0 ;
dqy
dx¯
< 0
dηf
dx¯
< 0 ;
dLf
dx¯
> 0 ;
dpf
dx¯
< 0 ;
dqf
dx¯
> 0 .
Considering a tightening of the carbon emissions constraint, dx¯ < 0, the
claims of the Proposition 6 follow.
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